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AFTERWORD
SAVING THE HONORABLE COURT: ASSESSING THE
PROPER ROLE OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT
Michael Allan Wolf*
A jurisprudence that seeks fidelity to the Constitution - a juris-
prudence of original intention - is not a jurisprudence of political
results. It is very much concerned with process, and it is a jurispru-
dence that in our day seeks to depoliticize the law.
- Edwin Meese III1
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was for-
ever "fixed" at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wis-
dom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the framers partic-
ularly profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was
defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war,
and momentous social transformation to attain the system of consti-
tutional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and
human rights, that we hold as fundamental today. When contempo-
rary Americans cite "The Constitution," they invoke a concept that
is vastly different from what the framers barely began to construct
two centuries ago.
- Thurgood Marshall 2
There are few greater delights in legal scholarship than the op-
portunity to have the last word in a symposium featuring distin-
guished - and dramatically differing - viewpoints. The thirteen
contributions that precede this afterword offer a provocative and
representative set of reactions to the ongoing debate over the role
of the Supreme Court in the American polity. This debate is by no
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. B.A., 1974, Emory University; J.D., 1977,
Georgetown University Law Center; A.M., 1979, Ph.D., 1991, Harvard University.
1. Edwin Meese III, Address, in 19 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 22, 29 (1985).
2. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2 (1987).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
means new, or even middle-aged. The struggle over the confirma-
tion of Associate Justice Clarence Thomas is but the latest in a
long line of pressure points in American constitutional history -
events such as controversial Supreme Court decisions, congres-
sional attempts to limit federal court jurisdiction, court-packing
plans, and other heatedly contested judicial nominations - that
have brought the issue of the character and function of the Su-
preme Court to the "front page" of popular discourse.
Some reflection on this diverse collection of ideas and assertions
brings to mind three questions: How helpful are the historical
sources of Framers' intent in the ongoing debate over judicial
power? Will conservative observers of the Court regret the swing
toward judicial restraint? What talents has the Supreme Court lost
in the most recent set of resignations and confirmations? By ad-
dressing each of these questions, I hope to help set the stage for a
continuation of the disputation so capably begun by my fellow
contributors.
A Framers' Rendition for Every Position
The allure of Framers' intent - a foundation for judicial deci-
sion-making championed most prominently of late by former At-
torney General Edwin Meese3 - affects nearly all of those joined
in this debate. Of course, one of the more ubiquitous sources for
determining the ideas and positions of the Framers is the Federal-
ist Papers. Not surprisingly, the authors in this collection employ
their share of selections - for a variety of purposes.
Professor Rotunda begins his perceptive foreword by evoking
Hamilton's views on the "duty" of judicial review from The Feder-
alist No. 78.4 Senator Leahy and Mr. Hooks, both fearful of
majoritarian excesses, cite Hamilton in support of a strong role for
the Senate in the Court appointment process.5 In contrast, Mr.
Jipping opens his plea for judicial restraint by contrasting exam-
ples of excess with the sentiment from three Hamiltonian
3. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 1.
4. Ronald D. Rotunda, Foreword: The Role of the Modern Supreme Court, 26 U. RICH. L.
REV. 433, 433 (1992).
5. Patrick J. Leahy, Advice and Consent: Ensuring Judicial Freedom, 26 U. RICH. L. REV.
447, 447 (1992); Benjamin L. Hooks, The Supreme Court as a Political Institution, 26 U.
RICH. L. REV. 451, 458 (1992).
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chestnuts.' Mr. McAteer builds his argument concerning the religi-
osity of those who constructed the Constitution on Federalist Pa-
pers passages by Hamilton and James Madison.7
Other constitutional Framers (and their nonparticipating con-
temporaries) whose words supply fodder for argument include
George Washington (on justice)8 and Thomas Jefferson (on fear of
the federal judiciary)9. Moreover, there are the "generic" 'asser-
tions, such as McAteer's somewhat anachronistic (and unsubstanti-
ated) description of "[t]he respect for Judeo-Christian moral tradi-
tions which permeated the founding generations.' 10
The pervasive use, by parties on opposite sides of key questions
like judicial activism and Supreme Court appointments, of Fram-
ers' intent "evidence" is neither atypical nor untroubling. Indeed,
have we reached the point at which a quotation from a source like
the Federalist Papers adds little to the substance of the debate?
The assertion here is not that the intent of the Framers is either
irrelevant or inaccessible; even Justice Marshall would refuse to
make either of those claims." Instead, the contributions in the
pages of this journal comprise one more sign that the debate over
the role and the responsibilities of the Supreme Court advances
when the participants recognize the negligible advantage to be
gained by echoing the phrases of our founding parents.
The Hazards of Shifting the Balance
Now that the latest phase of judicial activism by Court liberals
has come to an end, one might expect unqualified rejoicing from
those on the political right. As several of the contributions to this
symposium demonstrate, the celebration could be quite short-
lived, if certain disconcerting trends continue. The problem might
well be too much deference; that is, some Justices appear to be
carrying judicial restraint just a bit too far.
6. Thomas L. Jipping, Judiciary: Know Thy Place, U. RICH. L. REv. 481, 481 (1992). Jip-
ping also cites Hamilton on the limited role of the courts.
7. Edward E. McAteer, In Defense of a Principled Judiciary, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 459, 463
(1992).
8. See Strom Thurmond, The Supreme Court: Final Arbiter of Our Nation's Legal Dis-
putes, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 443 (1992).
9. See Beverly LaHaye & Ellen 0. Smith, The Supreme Court: New Hope for the Resto-
ration of Federalism, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 479, 479-80 (1992).
10. McAteer, supra note 8, at 463.
11. See Marshall supra note 2.
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The one case that in particular highlights this problem -and
that makes for some interesting bedfellows - is Employment Di-
vision v. Smith, 2 the free exercise case involving peyote use. Two
of the contributors, Mr. McAteer on the right and Professor Stros-
sen on the left, criticize Justice Scalia and the other members of
the Smith majority for their "hands-off posture,"'1 3 with Mr. Mc-
Ateer expressing "hope that a future Court will demonstrate re-
newed sensitivity to religious practices."' 4 In contrast, Mr. Jipping
and his left-leaning counterpart, Mr. Kropp, cite Smith as an ex-
ample of activist abuse. Mr. Jipping includes the peyote case with
two other cases of liberal excess' - Missouri v. Jenkins" (involv-
ing the use of judicial taxation to fund desegregated schools) and
Roe v. Wade'7 (protecting a woman's right to determine her biolog-
ical future) - while Mr. Kropp labels Smith "conservative
activism."' 8
There is an important lesson to learn from these unexpected alli-
ances. The beauty (and nature) of activism is often in the eye of
the beholder. The advocates of judicial restraint in one generation
(for example, the New Dealers of the 1930's) may turn out to be
the most vocal champions of activism in the next (the civil liber-
tarians during the Warren Court years). The ease with which such
shifts in ideological and jurisprudential rhetoric occur is the kind
of political reality that belies the separation of law and politics ad-
vocated and described by many critics of the Supreme Court. Con-
trast, for example, Mr. Hooks' unabashed endorsement of a politi-
cally charged confirmation process' 9 with Mr. McAteer's advocacy
of the Court's role as "even-handed referee, rather than active par-
ticipant in public policy disputes."20
Both extremes are inadequate. The "law is politics" view, though
often a realistic explanation for judicial developments, is a direct
challenge to the popular myth of our glorious Constitution. Too
12. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
13. Nadine Strossen, The Supreme Court's Role: Guarantor of Individual and Minority
Group Rights, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 467, 468 (1992).
14. McAteer, supra note 8, at 462 (emphasis added).
15. Jipping, supra note 7, at 481.
16. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Arthur J. Kropp, Reagan, Bush and the Supreme Court, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 495, 496
(1992).
19. Hooks, supra note 6, at 458.
20. McAteer, supra note 8, at 464.
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many in the audience following the debate over the Supreme
Court's role would reject attempts to equate the judiciary's inter-
pretation of that sacred document with the compromise and pos-
turing that takes place in and outside of the legislative chamber.
Still, "law is not politics" is no more satisfying. Advocates of ju-
dicial restraint either fail to acknowledge, or find it against their
interest to admit, that deference to the popular will (and to the
elected branches) is, in fact, the product of a "public policy"
choice. If the debate over the Court's role is to advance in a signifi-
cant way, we need to move beyond the rhetorical thrusts and par-
ries and to focus on the wisdom of the public policy goals advanced
and inhibited by judicial action and inaction. We also need a Su-
preme Court whose members fully appreciate the political and ju-
risprudential impacts of their decisions.
The Talented Trio: What the Court Has Lost
The last three members to leave the Court - Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., William Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall - brought to
their important position special talents, experiences, and expertise
that prepared them well for the challenges facing a Supreme Court
Justice. Justice Powell was the quintessential lawyer's lawyer. As a
partner in one of the South's leading law firms, he led the Ameri-
can Bar Association, the American Bar Foundation, and the Amer-
ican College of Trial Lawyers during the turbulent 1960's.21 His
bar leadership made him keenly aware of the major changes in the
practice of law and in the nature of lawyer professionalism that
have occurred over the past few decades.
More importantly, Justice Powell was an active participant in
efforts to implement the Supreme Court's school desegregation
mandates, the central social and political struggle of his day. Oliver
W. Hill, one of the legendary figures of the Civil Rights era, has
complimented his fellow Virginian for "demonstrat[ing] a strong
sense of moral responsibility and great integrity" during the fight
against "Massive Resistance" in the Old Dominion.2 The lessons
21. See, e.g., George Clement Freeman, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101
HARV. L. REV. 404, 404-07 (1987).
22. Oliver W. Hill, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 414, 415
(1987).
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learned in the trenches were not lost when Justice Powell donned
the black robe."
Justice Brennan, a son of Irish immigrants, sharpened his juris-
prudential skills as a justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court. As
a member of that tribunal, he was an active participant in the po-
litical and socioeconomic struggles that dominated the post-war
decades. As a state judge, for example, Brennan helped shape New
Jersey land-use law, a body of law that would later prove to be the
model for other states experiencing the pangs of suburban
growth. 4 Moreover, Brennan "remarked on occasion that it was
his experience with intricate gerrymandering plans in New Jersey
that enabled him to understand and penetrate the intricacies of
the Voting Rights Act cases that came to the Court over the
years."25 He came to the federal bench not as an unknown quantity
or a safe bet, but as an experienced jurist with an impressive paper
trail.
When the third member of this distinguished trio, Thurgood
Marshall, was named an Associate Justice he was already an exper-
ienced expert on the High Court. Professor Stephen Carter, a for-
mer Marshall clerk, describes the Justice as:
[a] man who, as an advocate, won more cases before the Supreme
Court than the other Justices argued (even in combination), who
served ably as a judge of the Second Circuit and as Solicitor General
of the United States, who held together the shifting and often bick-
ering coalition of lawyers that fought and won the legal arm of the
battle against mandated segregation . 2
There are few sitting (and potential) Justices whose resum6s con-
tain such significant entries.
What these three Justices from such diverse backgrounds had in
common was an acute political sense, acquired in" dramatically dif-
ferent arenas, but applied sensitively and skillfully to their chal-
lenging work on the Court. Only time will tell whether those who
23. See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV.
L. REv. 395, 396-97 (1987).
24. See CHARLES M. HAAR & JEROLD S. KAYDEN, LANDMARK JUSTICE: THE INFLUENCE OF
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN ON AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 19 (1989).
25. Nina Totenberg, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARv. L. REV. 33,
35 (1990).
26. Stephen L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall, 26 VAL. L. REV. XXXV, XXXViii (1991).
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now sit in their seats (and those to follow) will be able to continue
this legacy of informed decision-making.
A Final Thought: Lincoln's Litmus Test
Rumors of a litmus test for the confirmation of federal jurists
have become pervasive during the Reagan and Bush years. Ms.
Bryant, for example, cites two journalistic accounts as "proof" that
such a test exists. As with so much else in the history of judicial
nomination and confirmation, these allegations are far from novel.
Consider the following excerpt from the Lincoln-Douglas senato-
rial election debate, held in Springfield, Illinois, on July 17, 1858.
Stephen A. Douglas, the Democrat who would emerge victorious
(only to lose to Lincoln in the presidential race two years later),
was quite prescient in his reaction to Lincoln's harsh criticism of
the infamous Dred Scott 28 decision:
[I]t is the province and duty of the Supreme Court to pronounce
judgment on the validity and constitutionality of an act of Con-
gress .... But Mr. Lincoln intimates that there is another mode by
which he can reverse the Dred Scott decision. How is that? Why, he
is going to appeal to the people to elect a President who will appoint
judges who will reverse the Dred Scott decision .... [H]ow are the
new judges to be appointed? Why, the Republican President is to
call upon the candidates and catechise them, and ask them, "How
will you decide this case if I appoint you judge?" Suppose, for exam-
ple, Mr. Lincoln to be a candidate for a vacancy on the supreme
bench to fill Chief Justice Taney's place, and when he applied to
[the President], the latter would say, "Mr. Lincoln, I cannot appoint
you until I know how you will decide the Dred Scott case?" Mr.
Lincoln tells him, and then asks him how he will decide Tom Jones's
case, and Bill Wilson's case, and thus catechises the judge as to how
he will decide any case which may arise before him. Suppose you get
a Supreme Court composed of such judges, who have been ap-
pointed by a partisan President upon their giving pledges how they
would decide a case before it arose, what confidence would you have
in such a court?29
27. Anne Bryant, Balancing the Federal Judiciary, 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 485, 490 (1992).
28. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
29. The Lincoln-Douglas Debates: 1858, reprinted in THE DRED Scorr DECISION: LAW OR
POLITICS 75-6 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 1967).
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Like the years before the Civil War, these are tense times for the
Supreme Court. Much political capital has been spent and wasted
in the confirmation battles to fill the seats of Justices Powell,
Brennan, and Marshall. Pro-choice advocates are waiting for the
other shoe to drop, as it already has in the areas of civil rights and
criminal procedure. There are signs of popular dissatisfaction with
efforts to deconstruct the legal protections erected by the Warren
and Burger Courts. Increasingly, activists on the left are turning to
Congress for assistance, a trend that should lead to a test of the
strength of the Justices' commitment to judicial restraint.
The debate that permeates the pages of this journal will inten-
sify as the Rehnquist Court continues to distance itself from its
liberal and moderate predecessors. We can only hope that future
participants in the dialogue over the proper role of the honorable
Court will, for perhaps the first time, learn from the lessons of the
past.
